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Requiring a Nexus to National Security: Immigration, 
“Terrorist Activities,” and Statutory Reform 
INTRODUCTION 
Terik Ramadan, a renowned Muslim scholar and citizen of 
Switzerland, has been denied entry into the United States three 
times in the past decade despite his desire to pursue an academic 
career in America.1 In January of 2004, Ramadan was offered a 
position at the University of Notre Dame as a professor of Islamic 
studies.2 Prior to 2004, Ramadan had lectured throughout the 
United States at conferences sponsored by Harvard, Stanford, and 
Princeton.3 In connection with his offer from Notre Dame, he was 
issued an H1-B work visa, shipped all of his belongings to Indiana, 
and enrolled his children in school. However, his visa was 
“prudentially” revoked last-minute on the grounds that he had 
violated terrorist provisions within the USA PATRIOT Act 
(“PATRIOT Act”), meaning that he was considered a threat to 
“public safety or national security interests.”4 Ramadan, though, felt 
that the government prevented his entry in order to “suppress 
dissenting voices and . . . manipulate the political debate in America” 
because he had “publicly criticized U.S. policy in the Middle East, 
the war in Iraq, the use of torture, secret CIA prisons and other 
government actions that undermine fundamental civil liberties.”5 
Ramadan reapplied for a nonimmigrant6 visa in October of 2004, 
 
 1. Terik Ramadan, Why I’m Banned in the USA, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2006, at B1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Lihua Xu v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 2:08–cv–1023, 2010 WL 3942723 (S.D. Ohio 
Oct. 6, 2010). 
 5. Ramadan, supra note 1. 
 6. A “nonimmigrant” is a “noncitizen who seeks entry to the United States for a 
specific purpose to be accomplished during a temporary stay.” THOMAS ALEXANDER 
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 396 (6th ed. 
2008) (emphasis added). See also Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(15); 
Randall Monger, Nonimmigrant Admissions to the United States: 2011, DHS ANNUAL FLOW 
REPORT, July 2012, at 1−2, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets
/ statistics/publications/ni_fr_2011.pdf (“Examples of nonimmigrant classes of admission 
include foreign government officials; temporary visitors for business and pleasure; aliens in 
transit; treaty traders and investors; academic and vocational students; temporary workers; 
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which would have allowed him to attend various academic 
conferences, but he never received a response to his petition.7 His 
final application, made in September 2005, was also met with 
silence.8 
With the help of the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
American Academy of Religion, and the American Association of 
University Professors, Ramadan filed suit in federal court.9 The court 
ordered the government to accept or reject Ramadan’s September 
application within 90 days, stating, “[W]hile the Executive may 
exclude an alien for almost any reason, it cannot do so solely because 
the Executive disagrees with the content of the alien’s speech and 
therefore wants to prevent the alien from sharing this speech with a 
willing American audience.”10 At the imposed deadline, the 
government denied Ramadan’s final visa application, finding that he 
had “materially supported” terrorism by making donations to a 
French charity that supported humanitarian work in Palestine.11 
Interestingly, although the U.S. Embassy claimed that Ramadan 
“reasonably should have known”12 that the charity issued money to 
Hamas, Ramadan only made donations from 1998 to 2002, and the 
State Department did not label the charity as a “terrorist 
organization”13 until 2003.14 
Ramadan’s repeated exclusion is not surprising given the 
dramatic change in national security policies during the last decade, 
especially as these policies relate to immigration. For example, in 
response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, seven hundred noncitizens 
who were “deemed to be ‘of interest’ on security grounds” were 
 
exchange visitors; athletes and entertainers; victims of certain crimes; and family members of 
U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents, and special immigrants.”); STEEL ON IMMIGRATION 
LAW § 3:37 (2d ed.) (“A grant of a nonimmigrant visa requires a showing of three things: that 
the applicant is a bona fide nonimmigrant (coming to the United States temporarily), that the 
applicant is entitled to the nonimmigrant status being sought, and that the applicant is not 
inadmissible to the United States, or if inadmissible, has obtained a waiver of the ground or 
grounds of inadmissibility.”). 
 7. Ramadan, supra note 1. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Am. Acad. of Religion v. Chertoff, 463 F. Supp. 2d 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 10. Id. at 415. 
 11. Ramadan, supra note 1. 
 12. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). 
 13. See id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi). 
 14. Ramadan, supra note 1. 
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detained by the Department of Justice without bond “on the basis of 
immigration law violations.”15 The Department of Justice also 
“delayed the filing of charges or slowed hearings or final removal in 
such cases . . . , closed large numbers of removal hearings to the 
public, and sometimes . . . used classified evidence not shared with 
the individual in the course of the proceedings.”16 
On the legislative front, Congress passed the PATRIOT Act17 
only six weeks after 9/11, adopted the Homeland Security Act18 in 
2002, and implemented the REAL ID Act19 in 2005. Pieces of the 
PATRIOT Act, Homeland Security Act, and REAL ID Act have 
been incorporated into various sections of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”)—the principal body of law that regulates 
federal immigration procedures (e.g., naturalization, deportation, 
and visa applications)—with the effect that the INA now defines 
“terrorism” more broadly than any other federal statute.20 These 
three statutes represent only a sampling of several recently enacted 
anti-terrorism provisions within the INA that collectively exclude 
hundreds of noncitizens from entering the United States each year.21 
While this may ostensibly be seen as a victory for national security, in 
2009 a spokesman for the Department of Homeland Security 
reported that over 10,500 people excluded under the INA’s broad 
provisions had subsequently been granted visas upon receiving a 
waiver from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland 
 
 15. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 6, at 532. 
 16. Id. 
 17. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 18. Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
 19. REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109–13, Division B, § 103, 119 Stat. 231, 308–09 
(2005). 
 20. Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem 
of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 261 (2004) [hereinafter Perry, Too Many Grails] (“The 
definitions of terrorism that include the greatest amount of conduct are in immigration law.”). 
However, it is important to note that in McAllister v. Attorney General, the Third Circuit 
found that the INA’s definition of “terrorist activities” was not “overbroad” or “vague.” 444 
F.3d 178, 186 (3d Cir. 2006). The court stated, “While this definition is certainly broad, we 
conclude that it is neither vague nor overbroad in that it does not infringe on constitutionally 
protected behavior. The definition includes a great deal of conduct, but all of this conduct 
could reasonably constitute terrorist activities.” Id. 
 21. See, e.g., Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107–
173 (2002); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 108–458 (2004); 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110–161 (2008). For exclusion statistics 
pertaining to nonimmigrants in 2012, see infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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Security.22 Thus, the real victor has been inefficiency. As the 
spokesman conceded, “While the department views this achievement 
as significant, we also understand that a more efficient authorization 
process than the one that has been in place would reach even more 
people.”23 
By narrowing the definition of terrorism within the INA, those 
noncitizens who would otherwise receive a waiver—and therefore be 
considered nonthreatening to national security—could potentially 
receive authorization to enter the United States without having to 
appeal to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security. Acknowledging that “[t]errorism is notoriously difficult to 
define,”24 this Comment seeks to carefully refine various structural 
and substantive aspects of the INA’s definitions of terrorism by 
promoting a closer, more pronounced link to United States national 
security. 
This “nexus” to national security can be implemented in two 
important ways. First, a nexus can be implemented within the 
operational aspects of the INA’s anti-terrorism provisions by 
requiring immigration officers to make a separate and specific 
determination as to whether a noncitizen is likely to engage in 
terrorist activity after entry. This nexus would enhance the efficiency 
of the visa application process because much of the analysis typically 
conducted in the waiver decision would be accomplished at the 
outset rather than on appeal. Second, a substantive nexus can be 
established within the definition of “terrorist activity” by requiring 
such activity to be “unlawful” under the laws of the United States 
without respect to the laws of the place where the activity occurred, 
thereby providing immigration officials with a more concrete set of 
laws upon which to base their assessments. These suggestions are 
drawn from other sections of the INA, prior case law, and various 
federal laws, and are designed to more precisely preserve national 
security interests while also affording non-terrorists the opportunity 
to enter the United States. 
Part I of this Comment overviews the intersection of national 
security and immigration law throughout American history as well as 
 
 22. Marisa Taylor, Why Are U.S.-Allied Refugees Still Branded as “Terrorists?”, 
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, July 26, 2009, 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/07/26/72362/why-are-us-allied-refugees-still.html. 
 23. Id. 
 24. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 6, at 564. 
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more recent developments within the INA relating to anti-terrorism 
measures. Part II describes the current operation and structure of the 
INA’s national security grounds for inadmissibility, with particular 
focus on the terms of INA section 212(a)(3)(B), which define 
“engage in terrorist activity,” “terrorist organization,” and “terrorist 
activity.” Part III outlines two proposals that would refine the broad 
nature of the INA’s terrorism bar to entry by requiring a closer nexus 
to United States national security. Part IV concludes. 
 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERSECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
INTERESTS AND IMMIGRATION LAW 
The United States has an extensive history of excluding and 
deporting persons considered to be “political subversives.”25 This 
section provides a brief history of the confluence of national security 
interests and immigration law and then describes various iterations of 
the INA’s anti-terrorism provisions, which were first enacted in 
1990. 
A. History of National Security Measures in the Immigration Field 
Congress’s first major enactments affecting both national security 
and immigration were the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which 
were “primarily directed against the foreign-born and [were] 
propelled in part by the Federalists’ resentment and distrust of the 
many foreigners who sided with Jefferson.”26 The Alien Act afforded 
the President the capacity 
at any time during the continuance of this act, to order all such 
aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the 
United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are 
concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the 
government thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United 
States, within such time as shall be expressed in such order.27 
 
 25. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and 
Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and 
Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 833, 842 (1997); Mitchell C. Tilner, Ideological Exclusion of 
Aliens: The Evolution of a Policy, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 53–57 (1987). 
 26. BRIAN N. FRY, AMERICAN NATIVISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 65 (2001). 
 27. Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 570–71 (1798). 
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The Alien Act was never directly applied to any alien,28 although 
a number of foreign nationals left the United States to avoid the 
law’s effects.29 The Alien Act was harshly criticized by the Jefferson 
administration, and, as a result, was allowed to expire in 1800. The 
Alien Enemies Act, however, remains in effect today with little 
alteration and allows for the detention and removal of “all natives, 
denizens, or subjects” of nations or governments with which the 
United States is at war, following a public proclamation of the 
President.30 The Alien Enemies Act was used during World War II,31 
but it has always been applied selectively and “[p]residents have 
stopped short of rounding up all citizens of the foreign state present 
in the United States.”32 
Nearly a century after the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed, 
the Supreme Court upheld laws designed to hinder the immigration 
of Chinese persons.33 In these cases, the Court adopted the notion 
that a sovereign nation’s power to exclude was absolute: “[t]he right 
to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or 
upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, [is] an inherent and 
inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential 
to its safety, its independence and its welfare.”34 It has been observed 
 
 28. For the purposes of this Comment, the term “alien” refers to “any person not a 
citizen or national of the United States.” INA § 101(a)(3). 
 29. One author has posited that the Alien and Sedition Acts led to “the mass exodus of 
frightened foreigners.” JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND 
SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 175 (1956). 
 30. Alien Enemy Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (current version 
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–23 (2006)). The current law reads:  
Whenever there is a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation 
or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted, 
or threatened against the territory of the United States by any foreign nation or 
government, and the President makes public proclamation of the event, all natives, 
citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being of the 
age of fourteen years and upward, who shall be within the United States and not 
actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and 
removed as alien enemies. 
 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006). 
 31. The detention of Japanese-Americans during World War II, however, was based 
upon general military powers and not the Alien Enemies Act. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 
6, at 539. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 34. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711. See also Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609 (“The 
power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government 
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that the Court’s embrace of a plenary power of exclusion “may well 
have encouraged, and surely did not discourage, Congress from 
passing later laws permitting the exclusion and deportation of 
noncitizens of certain political persuasions, including anarchists, 
organized labor leaders, and Communist Party members.”35 For 
example, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1903, which 
stipulated that “anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the 
overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United 
States or of all government or of all forms of law, or the assassination 
of public officials,” could be excluded from entry.36 The 
Immigration Act of 1917 then expanded the grounds for 
deportation to cover actions subsequent to an alien’s entry.37 This 
Act stated that “any alien who at any time after entry shall be found 
advocating or teaching [subversion]” was deportable.38 In 1920, 
Congress expanded further in declaring that any alien who “wrote, 
published, circulated, or possessed subversive literature” could be 
deported.39 In the hunt against anarchist organizations, particularly 
those who supported the Bolshevik regime in Russia, Attorney 
General A. Mitchell Palmer led the infamous “Palmer Raids” in 
1919 and 1920, which led to the imprisonment of thousands and 
the deportation of over five hundred people.40 Overall, 
 
of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the 
right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the 
country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one. The powers of 
government are delegated in trust to the United States, and are incapable of transfer to any 
other parties.”). 
 35. Johnson, supra note 25, at 843. 
 36. Immigration Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214, repealed by 
Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 38, 39 Stat. 874, 897. See also Johnson, supra 
note 25, at 835 (“The assassination of President McKinley by an anarchist with a foreign-
sounding name, who was in fact a U.S. citizen, along with labor strife, culminated in 
congressional passage of a law in 1903 providing for the exclusion of anarchists.”). 
 37. See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889. 
 38. Id. 
 39. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 6, at 539 (citing Act of June 5, 1930, ch. 251, § 1, 
41 Stat. 1008). 
 40. Id. Contemporary legal professors poignantly remarked that “[p]unishments of the 
utmost cruelty, and heretofore unthinkable in America, have become usual. Great numbers of 
persons arrested, both aliens and citizens, have been threatened, beaten with blackjacks, struck 
with fists, jailed under abominable conditions, or actually tortured.” R.G. BROWN ET AL., 
REPORT UPON THE ILLEGAL PRACTICES OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 4 
(1920). 
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approximately 1250 aliens were deported between 1911 and 1940 
for having engaged in subversive activities.41 
During the Cold War and the McCarthy Era, Congress 
continued to enlarge statutory deportation grounds in the name of 
national security, this time taking aim at the Communist Party. In 
the Alien Registration Act of 1940, Congress determined that 
former members of the Communist Party were deportable as well as 
any person who advocated for or organized a group encouraging the 
“overthrow or destruction” of the United States government.42 Ten 
years later, when passing the Internal Security Act of 1950, Congress 
again expressed its disdain for the Communist Party: 
The Communist network in the United States is inspired and 
controlled in large part by foreign agents . . . . There are, under our 
present immigration laws, numerous aliens who have been found to 
be deportable, many of whom . . . are free to roam the country at 
will . . . . One device for infiltration by Communists is by procuring 
naturalization for disloyal aliens who use their citizenship as a 
badge for admission into the fabric of our society.43 
Throughout much of the 1950s, the Supreme Court broadly 
upheld anti-communist statutes,44 but later in the decade the Court 
eventually backtracked by requiring proof of a “meaningful 
association” with the Communist Party before finding grounds for 
deportation.45 Numerically speaking, only 230 noncitizens were 
deported on ideological grounds during the 1950s despite the 
breadth of Congress’s anti-communist enactments.46 However, it has 
been argued that “raw numbers . . . cannot reveal how many citizens 
and noncitizens might have been chilled from engaging in political 
activity” during the anti-communism era “because of the possibility 
that they would be penalized under the law.”47 
 
 41. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 1994 STATISTICAL 
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV. 166 (1996) (Table 66: Aliens 
Deported by Cause Fiscal Years 1908-80). 
 42. Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, §§ 1–4, 54 Stat. 670, 670–76 (1940) 
(current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385–87 (1994)). 
 43. Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, § 2(12)–(14), 64 Stat. 987, 
988–89 (1950). 
 44. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaugnessy, 342 U.S. 
580 (1952). 
 45. See Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 120 (1957). 
 46. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 41. 
 47. Johnson, supra note 25, at 849–50. 
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B. More Recent Developments in the INA: Expanding the Executive’s 
Power to Combat Terrorism 
After the Berlin Wall fell, Congress significantly curtailed the 
ideological grounds upon which an immigrant could be excluded. 
Under the Immigration Act of 1990, the sections excluding 
anarchists, communists, and totalitarians were largely replaced with 
anti-terrorism and foreign policy provisions, which permitted 
consular officials to bar entry to persons who had “engaged in 
terrorist activity” or who the officials had “reasonable grounds to 
believe” were likely to engage in terrorist activity after entry.48 The 
1990 Act defined terrorism without respect to the alien’s intent or 
motivation, focusing solely on acts committed, “that is, the statutory 
definition allowed virtually no possibility for an individual to show 
that his act was done in a good cause—even to support efforts meant 
to bring down a tyrant the United States had denounced.”49 In 
order to discontinue Cold War ideological exclusion against 
nonimmigrants, the Act allowed previously precluded persons to 
request review of their excludability in an effort to remove their 
names from the “automated visa lookout system.”50 The Attorney 
General and Secretary of State were also required to regularly update 
their lookout books.51 
Following the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the 
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, Congress passed the 
 
 48. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–649, § 601(a)(3), 104 Stat. 4978 
(1990). These security-related grounds of exclusion are currently included in INA § 212(a)(3). 
It should be clarified that immigrants could still be excluded for their affiliations with 
totalitarian parties (and this exclusion remains in effect as of March 2013), but this exclusion 
was no longer applicable to nonimmigrants after 1990. See INA § 212(a)(3)(D). As defined in 
the INA, immigrants refer to “every alien except an alien who is within one of the . . . classes 
of nonimmigrant aliens.” Id. § 101(a)(15). See also ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 6. 
 49. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 6, at 565. “Terrorist activities” within § 
601(a)(3)(B) of the 1990 Act included the following: 
(i) In general. Any alien who 
(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity, or 
(II) a consular officer or the Attorney General knows, or has reasonable 
ground to believe, is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity (as 
defined in clause (iii)), is excludable. An alien who is an officer, official, 
representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization is 
considered, for purposes of this Act, to be engaged in a terrorist activity. 
 50. Immigration Act of 1990 § 601(c)(1)–(2). 
 51. Id. § 601(c). 
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).52 The 
AEDPA instituted a process whereby the Secretary of State could 
designate “terrorist organizations,” and under what is now section 
219 of the INA, the Secretary of State could designate a group as a 
“foreign terrorist organization” if it was found that “the 
organization [was] a foreign organization” that “engage[d] in 
terrorist activity” that “threaten[ed] the security of United States 
nationals or the national security of the United States.”53 Persons 
who supported such organizations became subject to criminal 
penalties and the Secretary of the Treasury could freeze the 
organization’s assets.54 
In 2001, about six weeks after 9/11, the PATRIOT Act 
“broadened the definition of terrorist activity and created a three-
tiered system for classifying terrorist organizations.”55 Under this 
refashioned designation system, organizations that qualified as 
“foreign terrorist organizations” under the AEDPA (or INA section 
219) became known as Tier I organizations. Tier II organizations 
also included groups publicly designated by the Secretary of State; 
however, Tier II organizations were not subject to asset freezing.56 
Tier III organizations encompassed any “group of two or more 
individuals, whether organized or not, which engage[d] in, or has a 
subgroup which engage[d] in” committing, planning, or preparing a 
terrorist activity, or gathering information on prospective targets.57 
 
 52. 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132. 
 53. INA § 219(a)(1)(A)–(C). Prior to the passage of the AEDPA, Congress modified 
the phrase “engage in terrorist activity” in 1995 to appear as follows: 
The term “engage in terrorist activity” means to commit, in an individual capacity or 
as a member of an organization, an act of terrorist activity or an act which the actors 
knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support to any individual, 
organization, or government in conducting terrorist activity at any time, including 
any of the following acts: 
. . . 
III. The providing of any type of material support, including . . . 
transportation, communications, funds, . . . or training, to any individual the 
actor knows or has reason to believe has committed or plans to commit a 
terrorist activity. 
 54. See id. § 219(a)(2)(C). 
 55. Scott Aldworth, Comment, Terror Firma: The Unyielding Terrorism Bar in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1159, 1167 (2010). 
 56. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II). 
 57. Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). 
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The REAL ID Act of 2005 “represented a continuation in the 
trend to expand the terror-related grounds for exclusion and 
removal” in that it “expanded the terror-related grounds for 
inadmissibility and deportability, and amended the definitions of 
‘terrorist organization’ and ‘engage in terrorist activity’ used by the 
INA.”58 In particular, the REAL ID Act modified the definition of 
“engage in terrorist activity” to include “material support” to “any 
member” of a Tier II or Tier III terrorist organization.59 
Finally, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 (“CAA”) 
expanded the waiver authority of executive officials, exempted ten 
organizations60 from designation under the INA’s “terrorist 
organization” provisions, and formally classified the Taliban as a Tier 
I organization.61 The CAA also permits the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
Attorney General, to waive nearly all terrorism-related exclusions in 
INA section 212(a)(3)(B).62 However, if removal proceedings have 
 
 58. Michael John Garcia & Ruth Allen Wasem, Congressional Research Service Report 
RL32564, Immigration: Terrorist Grounds for Exclusion and Removal of Aliens (Jan. 12, 
2010), at 3, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32564.pdf. 
 59. See INA §§ 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc), (dd). 
 60. These organizations included the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation 
Army (KNU/KNLA), the Chin National Front/Chin National Army (CNF/CNA), the Chin 
National League for Democracy (CNLD), the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), the Arakan 
Liberation Party (ALP), the Tibetan Mustangs, the Cuban Alzados, the Karenni National 
Progressive Party (KNPP), groups affiliated with the Hmong, and groups affiliated with the 
Montagnards. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 (CAA), Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 
Stat. 1844, Div. J, § 691(b). 
 61. See id. § 691(d). 
 62. Memorandum from Michael L. Aytes, Acting Deputy Dir. of U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Serv., Implementation of Section 691 of Division J of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2008, and Updated Processing Requirements for Discretionary Exemptions to 
Terrorist Activity Inadmissibility Grounds (July 28, 2008), at 2, available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memo
randa/Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998-2008/2008/caa_691_28_july_08.pdf. The 
expansion of the Executive’s waiver authority was in direct response to policymakers’ concerns 
that the scope of this authority was too limited. Garcia & Wasem, supra note 58, at 6. For 
example, at a congressional hearing in 2006, Ellen Sauerbrey, a State Department official, 
asserted, 
Although Secretarial exercise of the inapplicability authority allows us to make 
significant progress in reaching some populations in need of resettlement, it does 
not provide the flexibility required in all refugee cases. For example, Cuban anti-
Castro freedom fighters and Vietnamese Montagnards who fought alongside U.S. 
forces have been found inadmissible on this basis, as have Karen who participated in 
resistance to brutal attacks on their families and friends by the Burmese regime. The 
Administration will continue to seek solutions for these groups and to further 
DO NOT DELETE 7/10/2015 12:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
708 
already commenced for an alien residing within the country, only the 
Secretary of Homeland Security can grant an exemption.63 Further, 
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security may 
exempt a group that qualifies as a Tier III terrorist organization from 
that categorization as long as the group has not “engaged in terrorist 
activity against the United States or another democratic country” 
and has not “purposefully engaged in a pattern or practice of 
terrorist activity that is directed at civilians.”64 
As these modern developments indicate, the INA’s substantive 
definitions relating to terrorism have increasingly expanded since 
they were first adopted in 1990. The waiver authority granted in the 
CAA, however, could portend a reduction in the INA’s broad 
exclusionary effects. Practically speaking, this reduction may depend 
on whether the United States enjoys a protracted period of domestic 
peace, because if the nation experiences another terrorist attack, the 
waiver authority may be rarely invoked or even eliminated 
altogether. 
 
II. THE CURRENT OPERATION AND STRUCTURE OF INA SECTION 
212(A)(3)(B) AND THE DEFINITION OF “TERRORIST ACTIVITY” 
The current “security related grounds” on which a foreign 
national may be deemed inadmissible are located in INA section 
212(a)(3). This section of the INA outlines the procedure for 
making security-related inadmissibility determinations and defines 
the core considerations involved in these determinations. 
A. General Structure 
Under the current version of the INA, several categories or 
“classes” of aliens are deemed “ineligible to receive visas and 
ineligible to be admitted to the United States.”65 Some of these 
 
harmonize national security concerns with the refugee admissions program. 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec. and Citizenship, Hearing 
on 
Oversight of U.S. Refugee Admissions and Policy, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Ellen 
Sauerbrey, Asst. Sec. for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration). 
 63. Aytes, supra note 62. 
 64. CAA § 691(a). 
 65. INA § 212(a). 
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excludable classes include aliens who “have a communicable disease 
of public health significance,”66 those who have committed “a crime 
of moral turpitude” or a crime “relating to a controlled substance,”67 
aliens who have committed “particularly severe violations of religious 
freedom,”68 human traffickers,69 money launderers,70 those who are 
likely to become a “public charge,”71 and importantly for this 
Comment, those who are excluded on national security grounds.72 
The national security grounds of inadmissibility, which are 
contained in INA section 212(a)(3), include (1) a general section 
covering espionage, sabotage, and the overthrow of the government 
by force;73 (2) terrorist activities;74 (3) threats to foreign policy;75 (4) 
membership in totalitarian parties;76 (5) participation in Nazi 
persecution, genocide, or torture;77 (6) association with terrorist 
organizations;78 and (7) recruitment or use of child soldiers.79 The 
second principal section explains the exclusion for “terrorist 
activities” and is the subject of this Comment. It contains three key 
subsections that provide extensive definitions of “engage in terrorist 
activity,” “terrorist organization,” and “terrorist activity.”80 
 
 66. Id. § 212(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 67. Id. § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)–(II). 
 68. Id. § 212(a)(2)(G). 
 69. Id. § 212(a)(2)(H). 
 70. Id. § 212(a)(2)(I). 
 71. Id. § 212(a)(4). 
 72. Id. § 212(a)(3). 
 73. Id. § 212(a)(3)(A). 
 74. Id. § 212(a)(3)(B). 
 75. Id. § 212(a)(3)(C). 
 76. Id. § 212(a)(3)(D). 
 77. Id. § 212(a)(3)(E). 
 78. Id. § 212(a)(3)(F). 
 79. Id. § 212(a)(3)(G). 
 80. See id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)–(vi). For excellent summaries of the anti-terrorism 
provisions within INA § 212(a)(3)(B), see Nicholas J. Perry, The Breadth and Impact of the 
Terrorism-Related Grounds of Inadmissibility of the INA, 06-10 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2006) 
[hereinafter Perry, Grounds of Inadmissibility]; 3B Am. Jur. 2d Aliens and Citizens § 1575; 1 
Immigration Law Service 2d § 3:47; STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 11:14 (2d ed.); 23 
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 171 (originally published in 2007); Garcia & Wasem, supra note 58, at 4–8. 
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B. Terrorism Grounds of Inadmissibility 
Under INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(i),81 there are nine “general” 
ways an alien may be found inadmissible: (1) the alien has “engaged 
in terrorist activity”; (2) an immigration officer has “reasonable 
grounds to believe” the alien engaged in or is likely to engage in 
terrorist activity; (3) the alien has incited terrorist activity under 
circumstances indicating an intent to cause death or serious bodily 
harm; (4) the alien is a representative of a Tier I terrorist 
organization; (5) the alien is a member of a Tier II terrorist 
organization; (6) the alien is a member of a Tier III terrorist 
organization; (7) the alien endorses or espouses terrorist activity or 
persuades others to do so; (8) the alien has received military training 
from a terrorist organization; (9) the alien is the spouse or child of 
any alien just described and the impermissible activity occurred 
within the last five years.82 Several of these grounds of inadmissibility 
 
 81. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i) appears as follows: 
(i) In General 
Any alien who— 
(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity; 
(II) a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, is engaged in or is 
likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity (as defined in clause (iv)); 
(III) has, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or 
serious bodily harm, incited terrorist activity; 
(IV) is a representative (as defined in clause (v)) of — 
(aa) a terrorist organization (as defined in clause (vi)); or 
(bb) a political, social, or other group that endorses or espouses 
terrorist activity; 
(V) is a member of a terrorist organization described in subclause (I) or (II) 
of clause (vi); 
(VI) is a member of a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), 
unless the alien can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the 
alien did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the 
organization was a terrorist organization; 
(VII) endorses or espouses terrorist activity or persuades others to endorse 
or espouse terrorist activity or support a terrorist organization; 
(VIII) has received military-type training (as defined in section 2339D(c)(1) 
of title 18, United States Code) from or on behalf of any organization that, 
at the time the training was received, was a terrorist organization (as defined 
in clause (vi)); or 
(IX) is the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible under the 
subparagraph, if the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible 
occurred within the last 5 years, is inadmissible. 
 82. See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(I)–(IX). An exception is provided for spouses and 
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turn on the phrase “engage in terrorist activity,” which, under 
section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv), includes committing, inciting to commit, 
preparing, planning, gathering information for, soliciting funds for, 
soliciting individuals to participate in, or materially supporting 
“terrorist activity.”83 
Inadmissibility may also result from association with a terrorist 
organization.84 As described previously,85 a “terrorist organization” 
can fall into one of three categories: Tier I organizations are those 
that are designated by the Secretary of State and can have their assets 
(which are either possessed or controlled by United States financial 
institutions) frozen by the Secretary of the Treasury;86 Tier II 
organizations are also designated by the Secretary of State in 
consultation with the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland 
Security upon finding that “the organization engages in [terrorist] 
activities,” and this designation is published in the Federal Register;87 
and lastly, Tier III organizations represent groups “of two or more 
individuals, whether organized or not, which engage[] in, or ha[ve] 
a subgroup which engages in” terrorist activities as described in INA 
section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv).88 
The definition of “engage in terrorist activity,” which focuses on 
the way terrorism can be carried out, and the definition of “terrorist 
organization,” which attempts to identify groups that facilitate 
terrorism,89 both fail to identify what constitutes terrorism. That task 
 
children “who did not know or should not reasonably have known of the activity causing the 
alien to be found inadmissible.” Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(ii)(I). An exception is also provided for an 
alien whom the Attorney General or the consular officer has “reasonable grounds to believe 
has renounced the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible.” Id. § 
212(a)(3)(B)(ii)(II). Thus, exceptions are provided for lack of knowledge and renunciation. 
 83. See id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)−(VI). 
 84. Id. § 212(a)(3)(F). An alien may also be inadmissible for membership in a terrorist 
organization. See id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(V), (VI). 
 85. See supra notes 52–64 and accompanying text for more discussion regarding the 
genesis and development of the INA’s “terrorist organization” classification system. 
 86. INA §§ 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I), 219. 
 87. Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II). Tier II organizations, unlike Tier I organizations, cannot 
have their assets frozen by the Secretary of the Treasury. See supra note 54 and accompanying 
text. 
 88. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). 
 89. See also 9/11 Commission Report, 382–83 (2004), available at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (“Public designation of terrorist financiers and 
organizations is still part of the fight, but it is not the primary weapon. Designations are 
instead a form of diplomacy, as governments join together to identify named individuals and 
groups as terrorists. They also prevent open fundraising. Some charities that have been 
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is left to the definition of “terrorist activity.” Under INA 
section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), “terrorist activity” includes: 
any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is 
committed (or which, if it had been committed in the United 
States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or 
any State) and which involves any of the following: 
(I) The highjacking [sic] or sabotage of any conveyance 
(including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle). 
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or 
continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a 
third person (including a governmental organization) to do or 
abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition 
for the release of the individual seized or detained. 
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected 
person . . . or upon the liberty of such a person. 
(IV) An assassination. 
(V) The use of any— 
(aa) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or 
device, or 
(bb) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous 
device (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with 
intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one 
or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to 
property. 
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the 
foregoing.90 
A connection to terrorist activity does not inevitably result in 
inadmissibility. As noted,91 the Secretary of State or the Secretary of 
Homeland Security92 may determine “in such Secretary’s sole 
 
identified as likely avenues for terrorist financing have seen their donations diminish and their 
activities come under more scrutiny, and others have been put out of business, although 
controlling overseas branches of Gulf-area charities remains a challenge.”). 
 90. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). 
 91. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
 92. The Secretary of State is required to consult with the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security before granting a waiver. INA § 212(d)(3)(B)(i). The 
Secretary of Homeland Security is required to consult with the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of State. Id. 
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unreviewable discretion” that INA section 212(a)(3)(B), or the 
terrorist grounds of inadmissibility, “shall not apply with respect to 
an alien [or group] within the scope of that subsection.”93 Courts do 
not have jurisdiction to review such waivers “except in a proceeding 
for review of a final order of removal,” a proceeding that only occurs 
for aliens who have already entered the United States and are now 
being deported.94 Also, waivers cannot be extended to aliens who “a 
consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, is engaged in or 
is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity”95 or to aliens 
who are members of a Tier I or Tier II terrorist organization.96 
It should also be noted that all of the “terrorist activities” 
grounds of exclusion apply to “aliens,”97 which encompasses both 
immigrants (including refugees applying for asylum and persons 
applying for permanent residency) and nonimmigrants (persons 
seeking to enter for a temporary stay).98 Further, the inadmissibility 
sections describing “terrorist activities” can also serve as grounds for 
deportation.99 Lastly, the inadmissibility grounds under INA section 
212(a)(3)(B) are retroactive100 and do not contain a statute of 
limitations; in other words, they “appl[y] regardless of when the 
activity took place.”101 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. A removal proceeding in this context might occur in two situations: first, the 
alien did something on United States soil constituting terrorist activity; second, there was after-
the-fact discovery of prior terrorist activity. The broader point is that aliens generally have 
more judicial protection once they have been admitted into the United States. See, e.g., 
McAllister v. Att’y Gen., 444 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2006); Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
 95. See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II). 
 96. Id. § 212(d)(3)(B)(i). 
 97. Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(i) (denying admission for “any alien” who falls under the 
following sections). 
 98. See supra note 6. 
 99. See INA § 237(4)(B). 
 100. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(c)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 348 
(Oct. 26, 2001); REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Division B, § 103(d), 119 Stat. 231, 
308−09 (May 11, 2005) (“The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date 
of the enactment of this division, and . . . shall apply to . . . (2) acts and conditions constituting 
a ground for inadmissibility, excludability, deportation, or removal occurring or existing 
before, on, or after such date.”). 
 101. 9 Foreign Affairs Manual § 40.32 N1.2-1(a). 
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III. ANALYZING POTENTIAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE STRUCTURE 
AND SUBSTANCE OF “TERRORIST ACTIVITIES” 
Numerous scholars have already commented on the INA’s 
provisions relating to “terrorist organizations” and the “material 
support” of terrorism,102 yet none has addressed how to procedurally 
determine whether a person is likely to participate in terrorist activity 
upon admission. Scholars have also generally failed to scrutinize the 
INA’s expansive and highly deferential approach to the 
“unlawfulness” requirement in the definition of “terrorist 
activity.”103 This Comment attempts to fill at least part of this gap by 
proposing two primary ways the INA’s provisions relating to 
“terrorist activities” can be modified to harmonize national security 
interests and individual rights. Moreover, these modifications could 
significantly benefit nonimmigrants. Very few scholars have 
addressed the definition and scope of “terrorist activities” with 
respect to nonimmigrant visa applicants, even though 
nonimmigrants are impacted more negatively by the terrorism bar 
than immigrants applying for asylum or permanent residency.104 
 
 102. See, e.g., Noah Bialostozky, Material Support of Peace? The On-the-Ground 
Consequences of U.S. and International Material Support of Terrorism Laws and the Need for 
Greater Legal Precision, 36 YALE J. INTL. L. ONLINE 59 (2011); Bryan Clark & William 
Holahan, Material Support: Immigration and National Security, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 935 
(2010); Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 
297 (2008); Julie B. Shapiro, The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations: The Effect on the Separation of Powers, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 
547 (2008); James J. Ward, The Root of All Evil: Expanding Criminal Liability for Providing 
Material Support to Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 471 (2008); Wayne McCormack, 
Inchoate Terrorism: Liberalism Clashes with Fundamentalism, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005); 
Eric Broxmeyer, The Problems of Security and Freedom: Procedural Due Process and the 
Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 439 (2004); Sahar Aziz, The Laws on Providing Material 
Support to Terrorist Organizations: The Erosion of Constitutional Rights or A Legitimate Tool for 
Preventing Terrorism?, 9 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 45 (2003); Jordan Fischer, Note, The United 
States and the Material-Support Bar for Refugees: A Tenuous Balance Between National Security 
and Basic Human Rights, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 237 (2012). 
 103. Despite the vast amount of scholarship regarding “material support” of terrorism 
and the definition of “terrorist organizations” (especially as it relates to humanitarian aid), it 
seems that only one author has attempted to tackle the definition of “unlawful” on a 
substantive level. See Perry, Grounds of Inadmissibility, supra note 80. 
 104. The Bureau of Consular Affairs reported that 814 nonimmigrants were determined 
ineligible for admission for having participated in “terrorist activities” in 2012 whereas only 76 
immigrants were denied on these grounds. See Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visa 
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This section first addresses the rationales for refining the INA’s 
approach to “terrorism” and then proposes two general 
modifications to the INA’s “terrorist activities” sections. Overall, this 
section advocates that an alien must presently be a danger to the 
security of the United States in order to be denied admission under 
INA section 212(a)(3)(B). This nexus to national security can be 
reinforced through restructuring the operation of the “terrorist 
activities” provisions and substantively narrowing the definition of 
“terrorist activity.” 
A. Rationales for Refining the INA’s Broad Definitional Net 
The INA’s definitions of “terrorist activity,” “engage in 
terrorism,” and “terrorist organization”—especially the qualifications 
for Tier III groups—are “extraordinarily broad” as Congress 
intended to “cast a very broad net” in protecting against 
terrorism.105 Casting a “very broad net” seems reasonable when read 
in conjunction with the 9/11 Commission’s findings in 2004: 
We found that as many as 15 of the 19 hijackers were potentially 
vulnerable to interception by border authorities. Analyzing their 
characteristic travel documents and travel patterns could have 
allowed authorities to intercept 4 to 15 hijackers and more effective 
use of information available in U.S. government databases could 
have identified up to 3 hijackers. . . . We also found that had the 
immigration system set a higher bar for determining whether 
individuals are who or what they claim to be—and ensuring routine 
consequences for violations—it could potentially have excluded, 
removed, or come into further contact with several hijackers who 
did not appear to meet the terms for admitting short-term 
visitors.106 
 
Ineligibilities (by Grounds for Refusal Under the Immigration and Nationality Act), Fiscal Year 
2012, U.S. STATE DEP’T, http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY12AnnualReport-TableXX.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 13, 2014). Current scholarship tends to focus on immigrants rather than 
nonimmigrants because immigrants generally have more opportunities for judicial review of 
their cases. See McAllister v. Att’y Gen., 444 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2006); Khan v. Holder, 584 
F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 105. Gerald Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment after 
Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 313, 321–22 (2000). See also McAllister, 444 F.3d at 
187 (“[T]he INA’s definition of ‘terrorist activity’ certainly encompasses more conduct than 
our society, and perhaps even Congress, has come to associate with traditional acts of 
terrorism, e.g., car bombs and assassinations.”). 
 106. 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 89, at 384. 
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The Commission’s report also stated that “the challenge for 
national security in an age of terrorism is to prevent the very few 
people who may pose overwhelming risks from entering or 
remaining in the United States undetected”107 and ultimately 
described travel documents as being “as important as weapons” for 
terrorists.108 Based on recent anti-terrorism legislation,109 it appears 
that Congress has attempted to prevent those “very few people” 
from obtaining admission documents by implementing tremendously 
broad definitions of terrorism. Though well-intentioned, this 
approach is unlikely to solve the problem of terrorist entry. 
First, it is imperative to note that the Commission’s report 
highlights failures in the visa process—for example, consular officers 
failed to “analyze [the hijackers’] travel documents and patterns” 
and the immigration system failed to “set a higher bar for 
determining whether individuals are who or what they claim to 
be”—rather than definitional inadequacies.110 Thus, maintaining and 
evaluating the efficacy of the Terrorist Screening Center,111 the 
Interagency Border Inspections System,112 and the Consular 
Lookout and Support System113 are more likely to protect national 
security than casting a broad definitional net. As the Commission 
asserted, “[b]etter technology and training to detect terrorist travel 
documents are the most important immediate steps to reduce 
America’s vulnerability to clandestine entry.”114 
Second, a broad definition of “terrorist activity” is 
operationalized through an ineffective expansion of the 
nonimmigrant visa application. The nonimmigrant visa application 
 
 107. Id. at 383. 
 108. Id. at 384. 
 109. See supra Part I.B. 
 110. 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 89. 
 111. The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) is administered by the FBI, consolidates all 
terrorist watch lists, and “responds around the clock to receive and provide information to 
federal, state, local, and foreign governments. About 270 million persons are screened each 
month by frontline enforcement agencies (not solely immigration agencies) that use the 
database.” ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 6, at 669. 
 112. The Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) consolidates records of 
“potentially dangerous or otherwise ineligible individuals . . . from more than 20 federal law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies.” Id. 
 113. The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) is run by the State 
Department and as of 2005, CLASS was reported to contain 19.6 million records on aliens 
ineligible to receive visas. Id. 
 114. 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 89, at 385. 
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asks applicants to voluntarily provide information that could lead to a 
finding of inadmissibility on terrorism grounds. For example, the 
DS-160 visa application asks applicants to list the organizations to 
which they belong or have donated money, their current employers, 
names of immediate family members, whether they have any 
specialized military, firearms, chemical, or nuclear training, and 
whether they have ever been members of a paramilitary, guerilla, or 
insurgent group.115 The form also asks the following questions with 
respect to terrorism: “[d]o you seek to engage in terrorist activities 
while in the United States or have you ever engaged in terrorist 
activities?”; “[h]ave you ever or do you intend to provide financial 
assistance or other support to terrorists or terrorist organizations?”; 
and “[a]re you a member or representative of a terrorist 
organization?”116 Asking applicants to voluntarily identify terrorist 
grounds that would disqualify them from entry is a hopelessly 
ineffective means of preventing terrorism. As the 9/11 Commission 
observed, “Terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, 
case targets, and gain access to attack. To them, international travel 
presents great danger, because they must surface to pass through 
regulated channels, present themselves to border security officials, or 
attempt to circumvent inspection points.”117 Thus, if terrorists travel 
through channels requiring a visa, they are unlikely to disclose their 
terrorist ties in the visa application. Increasing the number of 
questions asked on the DS-160 form in response to an expanded 
definition of “terrorist activity” will do little or nothing to achieve 
the goals of the broader definition. 
Third, the expansive definition of “terrorist activity” has 
produced inefficiency. Visa statistics show that 8,927,090 
nonimmigrants were granted visas in 2012.118 Of the nonimmigrant 
visa applications that year, 814 of them were refused (i.e., found to 
be ineligible) for having engaged in terrorist activities as defined in 
INA section 212(a)(3)(B).119 However, 470 “terrorist activity” 
 
 115. Online Nonimmigrant Visa Applications (DS-160), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://ceac.state.gov/GENNIV/Default.aspx (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
 116. Id. 
 117. 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 89 (emphasis added). 
 118. Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visas Issued at Foreign Service Posts Fiscal Years 2008 
–2012, U.S. STATE DEP’T, http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY12AnnualReport-TableI.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
 119. Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visa Ineligibilities (by Grounds for Refusal Under the 
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refusals were overcome in 2012, meaning that there was evidence the 
ineligibility did not apply, a waiver was approved, or relief was 
granted through law.120 Why, then, does Congress cast such a broad 
net when a substantial portion of the persons “caught” by it are 
subsequently permitted to pass through? It is the object of this 
Comment to demonstrate that refinement of the INA’s structure and 
definition of “terrorist activities” could potentially qualify those 470 
persons for entry upon their initial application, and thereby create a 
more efficient process while still preventing admission for persons 
who pose a legitimate terrorist threat. 
Finally, as was demonstrated by the Ramadan case, a broad 
definition can foster erroneous decisions that harm individuals.121 
The expansiveness of the definition creates more room for 
immigration officials to render improper, pretextual 
determinations—e.g., decisions that are based on ideological or 
political motives.122 
B. Structural Nexus to National Security 
On the one hand, the substantive definition of “terrorist activity” 
cannot be eradicated because it provides a legislative basis upon 
which to deny entry, and providing unfettered discretion or 
insufficient guidance to immigration officials would certainly be 
unwise given the potentially grave consequences of admitting a 
terrorist. On the other hand, too much activity is currently captured 
by the substantive definitions of “terrorist activities,” as is evidenced 
 
Immigration and Nationality Act) Fiscal Year 2012, U.S. STATE DEP’T, 
http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY12AnnualReport-TableXX.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 
2014). 
 120. Id. It is important to note that “the total number of ineligibilities overcome may not 
necessarily represent the same visa applicants found ineligible and recorded in the total of 
ineligibility findings” because “[a] visa may be refused in one fiscal year and the refusal 
overcome in a subsequent fiscal year.” Id. Also, the data for 2013 indicates that 591 
nonimmigrant visa applicants were refused entry on terrorism grounds while 352 refusals were 
overcome. Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visa Ineligibilities (by Grounds for Refusal Under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act) Fiscal Year 2013, U.S. STATE DEP’T, 
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/
Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2013AnnualReport/FY13AnnualReport-TableXX.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 13, 2014). However, the data for 2013 was still considered preliminary at the time 
this Comment was written. 
 121. See supra notes 1–14 and accompanying text. 
 122. See American Academy of Religion v. Chertoff, 463 F. Supp. 2d 400, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
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by the number of nonimmigrant visa refusals that were overcome in 
2012. A middle ground can be achieved by requiring a direct nexus 
to national security. This section focuses on how that link can be 
established in terms of statutory structure and standards of proof. 
1. Proposal: Consular officers, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of 
Homeland Security should be required to determine whether an alien is 
likely to engage in terrorist activity after entry, with the standard of 
proof being “reasonable ground to believe.” 
Of the nine ways an alien may be excluded under the “terrorist 
activities” section providing for “general” grounds of inadmissibility, 
only one of them—section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II)—includes 
determining whether an alien is presently a threat to national 
security. In other words, this determination is not mandatory. 
Several other sections of the INA outside of the “terrorist activities” 
provisions do mandate this determination. For example, INA section 
212(a)(3)(D)(i), which describes aliens who are inadmissible for 
being “a member of or affiliated with the Communist or any other 
totalitarian party,”123 states that if the alien proves that his 
“membership or affiliation terminated at least . . . 2 years before the 
date of such application . . . and the alien is not a threat to the security 
of the United States,” he is admissible.124 This language is repeated in 
the exception provided for close family members, wherein the 
Attorney General may waive the disqualification if the applicant is an 
immediate relative of either a United States citizen or a lawful 
permanent resident and “if the immigrant is not a threat to the 
security of the United States.”125 The relevant language in the first 
exception requires the alien to demonstrate he is not presently a 
threat to United States national security, and in the second 
exception, the Attorney General must be convinced that this is the 
case. 
This same determination is required in other portions of the 
INA. For example, INA section 212(a)(F), which precludes the 
admission of aliens “who have been associated with a terrorist 
organization,”126 requires the Attorney General or the Secretary of 
 
 123. Id. § 212(a)(3)(D)(i). 
 124. Id. § 212(a)(3)(D)(iii)(I)–(II) (emphasis added). 
 125. Id. § 212(a)(3)(D)(iv). 
 126. It should be emphasized that this section is not within the “terrorist activities” 
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State to engage in a two-step process to determine (1) whether the 
alien has been or is associated with a terrorist organization, and (2) 
whether the alien also “intends while in the United States to engage 
solely, principally, or incidentally in activities that could endanger the 
welfare, safety, or security of the United States.”127 
As referenced above, INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II), which is 
one of the nine “general” ways an alien can be excluded under the 
“terrorist activities” sections, prevents the admission of aliens who a 
consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security has “reasonable ground to believe” is either currently 
engaged in or “is likely to engage after entry” in terrorist activity.128 
In order to promote greater consistency with these other provisions 
of the INA and generate a stronger nexus to United States national 
security considerations, INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II) should be 
transformed to operate as a required element. 
Once this subsection is transformed into a necessary element,129 
the nine grounds of exclusion within the general “terrorist activities” 
section, 212(a)(B)(i), should operate like the two-step process 
provided in section 212(a)(F). First, one of the other eight 
subsections within section 212(a)(B)(i) must be satisfied—e.g., the 
alien “engaged in terrorist activity,”130 “endorses or espouses 
terrorist activity,”131 or is a “member of a terrorist organization.”132 
And second, a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the 
Secretary of Homeland Security must also make a specific 
determination regarding whether the alien is “likely” to engage in 
terrorist activity after entering the United States, with the standard 
of proof being “reasonable ground to believe.”133 Once these 
 
provisions of INA § 212(a)(3)(B). 
 127. Id. § 212(a)(3)(F). 
 128. Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II). 
 129. Making this a required element may have helped the respondent in the case of In re 
S-K-, which is discussed infra Part III.C: “It is clear that the respondent poses no danger 
whatsoever to the national security of the United States. Indeed, by supporting the [Chin 
National Front] in its resistance to the Burmese junta, it is arguable that the respondent 
actually acted in a manner consistent with United States foreign policy. And yet we cannot 
ignore the clear language that Congress chose in the material support provisions . . . .” 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 936, 950 (BIA 2006) (Osuna, Juan, concurring). 
 130. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(I). 
 131. Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII). 
 132. Id. § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(V). 
 133. Or, as was discussed in the first exception to totalitarian party membership, 
Congress could require the alien to affirmatively demonstrate to the satisfaction of immigration 
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modifications are made, INA section 212(a)(B)(i) would appear as 
follows: 
Any alien who a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the 
Secretary of Homeland Security knows or has reasonable ground to 
believe— 
(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity; 
(II) has, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death 
or serious bodily harm, incited terrorist activity; 
(III) is a representative (as defined in clause (v)) of — 
(aa) a terrorist organization (as defined in clause (vi)); or 
(bb) a political, social, or other group that endorses or 
espouses terrorist activity; 
(IV) is a member of a terrorist organization described in subclause 
(I) or (II) of clause (vi); 
(V) is a member of a terrorist organization described in clause 
(vi)(III), unless the alien can demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that the alien did not know, and should not reasonably 
have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization; 
(VI) endorses or espouses terrorist activity or persuades others to 
endorse or espouse terrorist activity or support a terrorist 
organization; 
(VII) has received military-type training (as defined in section 
2339D(c)(1) of title 18, United States Code) from or on behalf of 
any organization that, at the time the training was received, was a 
terrorist organization (as defined in clause (vi)); or 
(VIII) is the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible under 
the subparagraph, if the activity causing the alien to be found 
inadmissible occurred within the last 5 years,  
is inadmissible; and 
(IX) who a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary 
of Homeland Security knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, 
is engaged in or is likely to engage in terrorist activity (as defined in 
 
officials that he is not a threat to national security. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying 
text. 
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clause (iv)) against United States security interests134 after entry, 
is inadmissible. 
Modifying section 212(a)(B)(i) to operate like section 212(a)(F) 
would not eradicate the definitions of “engage in terrorism,” 
“terrorist organization,” or “terrorist activity,” and, consequently, is 
not a drastic departure from the current structure of the INA. 
Further, while section 212(a)(B)(i)(II) currently provides for a 
“reasonable ground to believe” standard of proof, the INA’s 
terrorism bar lacks a uniform standard, which could help provide 
consistency and clarity to a complex set of laws. The United States 
Supreme Court has asserted that a standard of proof serves to 
“instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our 
society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual 
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.”135 Therefore, 
uniformly implementing a “reasonable ground to believe” standard 
of proof would ensure that immigration officials are not casting the 
“net of exclusion” based on guesses and inferences, but are relying 
on reasonable evidence in support of their conclusions. While some 
might argue that instituting a uniform standard would allow easier 
entry for terrorists, consular officials are already statutorily required 
to provide the reasons for refusing an application.136 Thus, the 
uniform standard would merely ensure that these grounds are 
reasonable. Moreover, “reasonable ground to believe” is a relatively 
low threshold that is significantly easier to satisfy than 
“preponderance of the evidence,” which is the typical standard 
applied in civil and administrative proceedings.137 
Finally, instituting this two-step process expedites the overall visa 
application procedure because these two steps are essentially the 
same analysis performed in the waiver determination, which is 
detailed in INA section 212(d)(3). As the Board of Immigration 
 
 134. For discussion of the requirement that terrorist activity be against United States 
security interests, see infra Part III.B.1.a. 
 135. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 136. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.121(b)(1) (2013). 
 137. See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 423; Hoffman v. Loud, 111 Mich. 156, 158 
(1896) (“In civil cases, a preponderance of evidence is all that is required, and by a 
‘preponderance of evidence’ is meant such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, 
has more convincing force, and from which it results that the greater probability is in favor of 
the party upon whom the burden rests.”). 
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Appeals explained in Matter of Hranka,138 the Attorney General 
must consider “the risk of harm to society if the applicant is 
admitted” when deciding whether to grant a waiver to a 
nonimmigrant visa applicant.139 Under the proposed version, this risk 
assessment would have to be performed by the consular officer at the 
outset rather than on appeal. Furthermore, because aliens who are 
denied visas are likely to apply for waivers anyway, conducting this 
analysis in the initial determination expedites the process. 
a. The separate determinations requirement and Cheema. 
The application of this two-step process was effectively illustrated 
by the Ninth Circuit in Cheema v. Ashcroft.140 Most importantly, 
Cheema demonstrates that each step of the process should be 
considered independently to ensure that “reasonable grounds” are 
provided to support each determination. 
In this case, Harpal Singh Cheema (Cheema) and his wife, 
Rajwinder Kaur (Kaur), petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review of an 
order from the Board of Immigration Appeals denying them 
withholding of deportation and asylum.141 At the time of their 
petitions, an alien was ineligible for withholding of deportation when 
there were “reasonable grounds for regarding [the alien] as a danger 
to the security of the United States.”142 In interpreting this 
provision, the Ninth Circuit stated that “an alien excludable for 
participation in terrorist activity is not automatically a danger to the 
United States, and that the bar to relief requires a separate 
determination with respect to the alien’s danger to national 
security.”143 The Ninth Circuit adopted the Board’s three-pronged 
test for determining whether an alien poses a danger to national 
 
 138. 16 I. & N. Dec. 491 (BIA 1978). 
 139. Id. at 491. The Board of Immigration Appeals stated that “the seriousness of the 
applicant’s immigration law, or criminal law violation, if any” and “the nature of the applicant’s 
reasons for wishing to enter the United States” must also be weighed. Id. 
 140. 383 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 141. Id. at 850. 
 142. Id. at 856 (quoting INA § 243(h)(2)(D)). Similarly, under a former version of the 
INA that was applied in this case, an alien could not be granted asylum if he had participated in 
terrorist activity unless the Attorney General determined “that there were not reasonable 
grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the United States.” Id. at 855 
(quoting INA § 208, as amended by AEDPA § 421). 
 143. Id. at 855 (emphasis added). 
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security.144 This test stipulated that when “an alien acts in a way 
which (1) endangers the lives, property, or welfare of United States 
citizens; (2) compromises the national defense of the United States; 
or (3) materially damages the foreign relations or economic interests 
of the United States,” the alien is considered a danger to national 
security.145 Significantly, the court also interpreted “reasonable 
grounds” to mean “substantial evidence”—i.e., a prong of the test 
could only be satisfied if it was supported by substantial evidence.146 
With respect to Kaur, the Ninth Circuit held that her petition for 
withholding deportation should be granted because “the Board’s 
conclusion that her donations to Indian widows and orphaned 
children ‘obviously’ and ‘inherently’ posed a danger to the security 
of the United States stretches speculation to its breaking point.”147 
Although the Board had determined that those donations were to 
Sikh militants rather than widows and orphans, there were no facts 
presented by the INS to support this claim.148 
With respect to Cheema, the Board had concluded that he 
engaged in terrorist activity by soliciting funds for Sikh resistance 
organizations in India.149 Consequently, in applying the first and 
second prongs of the national security test, the Board denied his 
request for withholding of removal because “‘[i]t is clear that those 
who engage in terrorism within the United States, even when that 
terrorism is not directly aimed at the United States, necessarily 
endanger the lives, property, and welfare of United States citizens 
and compromises our national defense.’”150 The Ninth Circuit 
adamantly rejected this “self-evident” conclusion, stating that the 
Board failed to articulate any substantial evidence that would “link 
the finding of terrorist activity affecting India with one of the criteria 
[or prongs] [of] . . . our national security [test].”151 The court 
continued in asserting that activities posing a danger to one nation—
even if those activities are militant—do not necessarily present a 
danger to United States national security, as “[o]ne country’s 
 
 144. Id. at 856. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 853. 
 149. Id. at 857. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 7/10/2015 12:30 PM 
697 Requiring a Nexus to National Security 
 725 
terrorist can often be another country’s freedom-fighter.”152 
Accordingly, Cheema’s petition for withholding of deportation was 
remanded so that the Board could base its determination concerning 
whether Cheema posed a threat to United States security on 
evidence rather than inferences.153 It is necessary to note, however, 
that the Cheema decision has subsequently been limited to cases in 
which a refugee filed for asylum before April 1, 1997, because 
Cheema was based on previous versions of the asylum and 
withholding statutes.154 
In terms of establishing a nexus to national security, the 
applications of Cheema to the current version of the INA are 
significant. First, as has been previously advocated, if present 
endangerment to United States national security—which is 
essentially analogous to “likely to engage after entry in any terrorist 
activity”—was added as a required element of general “terrorist 
activities,” separate determinations would be made regarding 
whether the alien engaged in terrorist activity and whether the alien 
is a danger to national security. Second, requiring separate 
determinations encourages immigration officials to use concrete 
evidence to support their decisions. As the Ninth Circuit noted, the 
INS (which is now part of the Department of Homeland Security), 
along with the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, and Treasury, 
possesses “extensive resources” and “is in a unique position to 
provide” substantiating evidence.155 
Under the separate determinations approach, there is potential 
for overlap in the determinations, but this overlap should not lead to 
“automatic” conclusions.156 This means that immigration officials 
would not be permitted to simply infer that a person would be a 
threat to national security based solely on the fact that the person 
participated in “terrorist activities.” For example, a consular official 
may have reason to suspect that an alien is likely to engage in 
terrorist activity after entry if the alien is currently a member of a 
Tier I or Tier II terrorist organization, but membership alone would 
not necessarily demonstrate the requisite likeliness. If the alien “has 
 
 152. Id. at 858. 
 153. Id. at 859–60. 
 154. McAllister v. Att’y Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 189 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 155. Cheema, 383 F.3d at 857. 
 156. See id. at 855. 
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engaged in terrorist activity” in the past and is not currently a 
member of a terrorist organization, the official’s determination of 
whether the alien is likely to participate in terrorist activity after entry 
is probably more difficult. 
To further illustrate, imagine that a Chinese citizen stole a car by 
threat of force thirty years ago, served the requisite prison sentence, 
never committed another crime, has several family members in 
Seattle, and has been invited to attend a business conference there. 
Because there is no statute of limitations within the current version 
of the INA, this person would likely be inadmissible for having 
participated in “terrorist activity,” or hijacking; however, by 
requiring separate determinations, the consular official could now 
permit this person to enter upon his initial application if it is found 
that he has no recent history or present proclivity to engage in 
terrorist activities—that is, he has been rehabilitated. Overall, the 
separate determinations approach effectively allows immigration 
officers to balance several factors—such as the recency of the activity, 
the extent of the harm caused, and, importantly, the activity’s 
connection to the United States—in determining whether an alien is 
or will be a threat to national security. 
Conceptually speaking, on one end of the “terrorist activity” 
spectrum is harmful activity that has no nexus to the United States, 
and on the other end is non-serious activity that is directed at the 
United States. As long as there is reasonable, concrete evidence to 
suggest that an alien would be a threat to the security of the United 
States, activity on either end of the spectrum could lead to a finding 
of inadmissibility. As explained in Cheema, the underlying point is 
that consular officials should be making conscious, evidence-based 
decisions as to whether a person will harm national security. Thus, 
allowing for this balancing accommodates both national security 
interests and individual rights. 
C. Substantive Nexus to the Laws of the United States 
While the proposal proffered in Part III.B focused on 
implementing a stronger nexus to United States security in terms of 
statutory structure, the following suggestions are aimed at 
substantively linking the definition of “terrorist activity” to the laws 
of the United States. 
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1. Proposal: Congress should redefine “unlawful” to only encompass 
United States laws. 
Under the INA, “terrorist activity” must be “unlawful under the 
laws of the place where it is committed,” the “laws of the United 
States,” or the laws of “any State” within the United States.157 The 
INA currently does not define the term “unlawful.” 
In the Board of Immigration Appeals’ seminal decision, In re S-
K-,158 the Board stated that the question of whether activity is 
“unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed” is one 
of “foreign law and is a factual issue on which the respondent bears 
the burden of proof . . . to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the [terrorism bar to asylum or admission] is inapplicable.”159 In 
this case, the respondent, a citizen of Burma applying for asylum, 
argued that because the United States did not recognize the 
Burmese government’s legislative acts, the actions of the Chin 
National Front (or “CNF,” the alleged terrorist organization) that 
she was found to have supported were not “unlawful” under 
Burmese law.160 The Board, however, found that the presence of an 
embassy in Burma and the maintenance of diplomatic relations with 
the current Burmese regime was enough to conclude that “in some 
sense or degree, the United States recognizes as legitimate the 
Burmese Government.”161 As a result, the Board rejected this 
argument and was unwilling to rule that “a foreign sovereignty 
would not be recognized by the United States Government,” leaving 
such a determination to “elected and other high-level officials.”162 
The respondent further argued that Congress deliberately used 
the term “unlawful” (which she defined as “unethical” or “morally 
repugnant” conduct) instead of “illegal” (which she defined as 
conduct inconsistent with technical rules), but the Board was not 
“convinced that Congress intended different meanings for the terms 
 
 157. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) (emphasis added) (“As used in this [Act], the term ‘terrorist 
activity’ means any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed 
(or which, if it had been committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of 
the United States or any State) . . . .”). 
 158. 23 I. & N. Dec. 936 (BIA 2006), 2006 WL 1976710. 
 159. Id. at 939. 
 160. Id. at 938. 
 161. Id. at 939–40. 
 162. Id. at 940. 
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‘unlawful’ and ‘illegal.’”163 Ultimately, the fact that the Burmese 
government “appear[ed] to consider the activities of the CNF 
unlawful” was enough for the Board to conclude that the “unlawful” 
requirement was satisfied, meaning that the respondent failed to 
meet her burden of proof.164 
The holding in this case is unsatisfying for several reasons. 
Requiring the respondent to demonstrate that the Burmese 
government, “a military dictatorship ruled by the majority Burman 
ethnic group,”165 did not consider her actions “unlawful” seems 
illogical at best, especially considering the United States only 
recognizes the dictatorship in only “some sense or degree.” Further, 
in asserting that the Burmese government “appeared to consider” 
certain actions unlawful, the Board failed to point to any specific 
facts or arguments that led them to this conclusion. Perhaps the 
Board presumed unlawfulness because the record stated that the 
CNF was “an organization which uses land mines and engages in 
armed conflict with the Burmese Government,”166 or because the 
“Burmese military [is] known to torture anyone affiliated with the 
CNF,”167 or merely because the respondent was fearful for her life if 
she returned to Burma.168 Although requiring an official position 
from a foreign government would be excessive, presuming 
unlawfulness seems insufficient—the Board could potentially find a 
specific conviction or a provision in Burmese law indicating not just 
disdain for the CNA but the unlawfulness of its actions. Even though 
the Board’s holding likely rested on the respondent failing to meet 
her burden of proof rather than the Burmese government’s 
presumed perspective,169 the Board’s opinion flounders in 
establishing a clear precedent for immigration officials to follow in 
determining whether specific conduct is unlawful in a foreign nation. 
Clearly, the unlawfulness determination is riddled with difficulty 
for both the applicant and immigration officials. In order to provide 
clarity and promote a closer nexus to the United States’ legal 
 
 163. Id. at 939 n.3. 
 164. Id. at 940 (emphasis added). 
 165. Id. at 937. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. at 941 (“[T]he respondent has not provided evidence that would rebut this 
conclusion or lead us to interpret the Act differently.”). 
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conceptions of terrorism, Congress should omit the phrases “under 
the laws of the place where it is committed” and “any State” from 
INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), which would mean that the 
“unlawful” determination would only be evaluated in light of United 
States law. United States courts can be trusted to make more 
competent determinations regarding United States law and the 
difficulties illustrated by In re S-K- could also be avoided, meaning 
that courts would no longer have to make “in some sense or degree” 
conclusions concerning whether foreign laws were violated.170 
Congress should also explicitly define “unlawful” to more clearly 
guide immigration officials and courts. “Unlawful” could be 
confined to violations of the federal criminal code, or, in the 
alternative, violations of federal laws that refer specifically to 
terrorism. There are, however, twenty-two definitions of terrorism 
within federal law,171 and if Congress wanted to adopt a narrower 
approach, “unlawful” should refer only to violations of one, or at 
most a handful, of those definitions.172 For example, the terrorism 
chapter of the federal criminal code, rather than all of the sections of 
the code, could be used. The terrorism chapter includes definitions 
for “domestic terrorism,” “international terrorism,” the “federal 
crime of terrorism,” “harboring or concealing terrorists,” “providing 
material support to terrorists,” violence against a national of the 
United States, as well as a definition of “terrorist organization” 
extracted from the INA.173 Upon close examination and given the 
express overlap with the INA’s definition of “terrorist 
organization,”174 the specific contours of these definitions are 
congruent with the elements of “terrorist activity” within the INA. 
 
 170. Because the government is competent in United States law, perhaps the burden of 
proof could now lie with the government rather than the respondent. This shift in the burden 
of proof aligns with fundamental notions of fairness, as it is typically the task of the 
government to demonstrate that a person has violated the law. See, e.g., Johnson v. Florida, 
391 U.S. 596, 598 (1968) (“The burden . . . is on the State to prove that an accused has 
committed an act bringing him within a criminal statute.”). 
 171. Perry, Too Many Grails, supra note 20, at 273. 
 172. See also id. (“A single definition would allow better communication between 
agencies in the fight against terrorism and provide at least some shielding to charges that the 
United States is inconsistent in whom it labels a terrorist.”). 
 173. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2331(5), 2331(1), 2332b(g)(5), 2339(a), 2339A(a), 2332(a)–
(c), 2339B(g)(6). 
 174. For a thorough discussion of each of these definitions, see Perry, Too Many Grails, 
supra note 20, at 256–59. 
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Moreover, even though a conviction under the criminal code 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt,175 the INA could still 
maintain the proposed “reasonable ground to believe” standard of 
proof176 in determining whether conduct is “unlawful,” which would 
help to preserve the civil nature of the INA.177 
The Third Circuit has arguably adopted a more narrow 
conception of “unlawful” that would align with this proposal. 
Specifically, it could be inferred from the court’s holding in 
McAllister v. Attorney General of the United States178 that “unlawful” 
refers only to violations of criminal law, given the court’s 
determination that common law criminal defenses could potentially 
refute or invalidate the “unlawful” requirement.179 Although this 
inference is somewhat tenuous given that the Third Circuit did not 
expressly state that “unlawful” only referred to violations of criminal 
law, narrowing the INA’s conception of “unlawful” would still be 
beneficial because having “numerous definitions” leads to 
“inconsistency in determining what terrorism is.”180 
Overall, the “unlawful” requirement may have little practical 
utility because all of the activities enumerated in the “terrorist 
activity” section are already unlawful under the laws of the United 
States. As evidenced by In re S-K-, a criminal conviction or evidence 
of a civil suit is currently not necessary to satisfy the unlawful 
element.181 Instead, the appearance of unlawfulness is sufficient.182 
Given these considerations, perhaps Congress could remove the 
unlawful requirement altogether. But, if Congress were unwilling to 
 
 175. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000). 
 176. See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II). 
 177. See Perry, Too Many Grails, supra note 20, at 274. 
 178. 444 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 179. Id. at 186–87. The precise holding of the Third Circuit was that the defenses of 
incapacity and self-defense could exclude an act from being labeled as “terrorist activity” under 
INA § 202(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b), which requires “the actor to have the specific intent to 
endanger the safety of individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.” Id. at 186. But, 
because this analysis was part of the larger discussion of unlawfulness and because the court 
specifically stated that self-defense, in the context of a given hypothetical, “negates the 
‘unlawful’ element,” it could be inferred that the action must violate criminal law in order to 
be considered “unlawful.” See id. at 186–87. Although this inference is not clear-cut, it has 
been argued. See Perry, Grounds of Inadmissibility, supra note 80. 
 180. Perry, Too Many Grails, supra note 20, at 272. 
 181. See generally In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936 (BIA 2006). 
 182. See id. at 940. 
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do so, refining the requirement to only encompass the laws of the 
United States would be a significant step in the right direction. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because the doctrine of consular nonreviewability typically bars 
the judiciary from reviewing the issuance or denial of a visa 
application, modifications to the INA’s anti-terrorism provisions for 
nonimmigrants seeking entry would likely have to be effectuated 
through legislative action.183 Despite this limitation, which is likely a 
principal reason for the dearth of scholarship on the matter, the issue 
is still salient given that 814 nonimmigrant visa applications were 
refused in 2012 for having engaged in “terrorist activity,” although 
470 refusals were overcome.184 The INA can more effectively grant 
admission to those nonimmigrants who have participated in 
“terrorist activity” but merit waivers by requiring aliens to pose a 
danger to United States security, implementing a standard of proof 
for this determination, and linking certain substantive aspects of the 
terrorism bar to United States laws. 
The modifications proposed in this Comment could also benefit 
immigrants. As the INA’s provisions become less broad and 
ambiguous, there is less room for lofty executive interpretations 
under the Chevron doctrine because the realm of “permissible 
construction” is narrowed.185 The Ninth Circuit in Khan v. Holder186 
 
 183. “In view of the political nature of visa determinations and of the lack of any statute 
expressly authorizing judicial review of consular officers’ actions, courts have applied what has 
become known as the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. The doctrine holds that a consular 
official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa is not subject to judicial review, at least unless 
Congress says otherwise.” Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(emphasis added). See also U.S. ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir. 1927) 
(The “[u]njustifiable refusal to visé a passport may be ground for diplomatic complaint by the 
nation whose subject has been discriminated against . . . [but] [i]t is beyond the jurisdiction of 
the court.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 184. Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visa Ineligibilities (by Grounds for Refusal Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act) Fiscal Year 2012, U.S. STATE DEP’T, 
http://travel.state.gov/con
tent/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2012AnnualReport/FY12AnnualReport-
TableXX.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
 185. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well 
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, 
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recently stated that federal courts “have jurisdiction to determine the 
scope and meaning of the statutory terrorism bar, including the 
definition of ‘terrorist organization’ and ‘terrorist activity,’ as these 
present purely legal questions. We also have jurisdiction to determine 
whether the [alien] meets this standard.”187 Therefore, if the 
proposals included in this Comment were adopted, the judiciary 
could more adequately enforce standards of proof for determinations 
affecting immigrants applying for asylum or permanent residency.188 
Although no waivers were approved for immigrant applicants refused 
on terrorism grounds in 2012,189 increasing the potential for judicial 
review would at a minimum safeguard against arbitrary decisions of 
consular officials. 
As has been demonstrated, the definitional net cast by the INA’s 
anti-terrorism provisions is too broad. By refining the operation, 





the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the 
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the 
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.”). 
 186. 584 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 187. Id. at 780. 
 188. These proposals would also allow the judiciary to enforce more adequate standards 
that are created not by the judiciary but by Congress. 
 189. Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visa Ineligibilities (by Grounds for Refusal Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act) Fiscal Year 2012, U.S. STATE DEP’T, 
http://travel.state.gov/con
tent/dam/visas/Statistics/AnnualReports/FY2012AnnualReport/FY12AnnualReport-
TableXX.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
* J.D., April 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I would 
like to thank Professor David Moore and Professor Eric Jensen for their invaluable feedback. 
